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Abstract 
Little is still known about how climate policy initiatives intersect with national level 
development agendas; the winners, losers and potential trade-offs between different goals, 
and the political and institutional factors which enable or inhibit integration across different 
policy areas. This paper addresses this gap by applying a political economic analysis to case 
studies on low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in Mozambique. In examining the 
intersection of climate and development policy, we demonstrate the critical importance of 
politics, power and interests when climate-motivated initiatives hit wider and more complex 
national policy contexts, ultimately determining the prospects of achieving integrated climate 
policy and development goals in practice. We advance the following arguments: (1) the 
importance of understanding both the informal nature and historical embeddedness of 
decision making around key issue areas and resource sectors of relevance to climate change 
policy; (2) The need to understand and engage with the interests,  power relations and policy 
networks that will shape the prospects of realising climate policy goals; (3) the ways in which 
common global drivers have very different impacts upon national level climate change 
debates once refracted through national levels institutions and policy processes, and (4) how 
climate change and development outcomes, and the associated trade-offs, may look very 
different depending on how it is framed, who frames it, and in which actor coalitions.  
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1 Introduction  
 
The need for climate policy goals to be integrated with development goals in developing 
countries is undisputed (REF). A number of developing countries now have strategies for 
development and climate change, under the banners of ‘climate resilient development’, 
‘climate compatible development’ or similar concepts, which sets out goals, envisaged 
synergies across mitigation, adaptation and development, and implementation strategies 
(REF). There is also a limited, but growing body of literature that examines how various 
climate policy initiatives are implemented, as well as potential synergies and trade-offs 
between the different goals (Stringer et al. 2014; Suckall et al. 2013; 2014; Shames et al. 
2013).  
 
What is less clear, however, is whether and how climate change and development benefits 
will materialise in the real world, including the processes whereby decisions are made, by 
whom, and who wins and who loses from various initiatives and actions to promote 
integration. Despite an emerging recognition that ‘politics matter’ in adaptation and mitigation 
policy at national and subnational levels in developing countries (e.g., Dodman and Mitlin, 
2014; Nightingale et al., this issue), there is as yet little analysis of how, when, why and for 
whom they matter in particular settings. As noted by Lockwood (2013), the academic and 
policy debates on climate policy goals, such as those associated with ‘triple wins’ (REF), have 
little meaning unless they are analysed in relation to the political context in which they are 
being pursued.  
 
In this paper, we address the question of what happens when global initiatives on climate 
change and development intersect with national policy contexts with their diverse set of 
actors, interests and politics, using case studies of low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon 
forestry in Mozambique. We apply a conceptual framework grounded in diverse traditions of 
political economy to the two cases. Our starting point is that initiatives to support climate 
policy and development goals do not happen in a political vacuum, but are shaped by on-
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going and pre-existing political and institutional contexts and decision making processes, 
along with their associated actor relations and power structures.  
 
The paper analyses how low carbon energy and carbon forestry have entered the national 
policy contexts in Kenya and Mozambique, respectively, how they are being negotiated 
among actors, with what consequences, and for whom. The two cases represents situations 
where the potential scope for synergies between climate change and development goals have 
been identified, but where little is known as yet on how it plays out in practice. As highlighted 
by Nightingale et al. (2015), adaptation policies and programmes have to date been 
considered in isolation from development or mitigation policy areas. The case studies in this 
paper illustrate how the interests of actors pursuing climate mitigation through low-carbon 
energy and carbon forestry can contradict the development (and adaptation) interests of other 
actors. 
 
Following this, we place particular emphasis on the importance of institutions, policy 
processes and social relations and the ways in which these mediate access to resources, and 
representation and voice within institutions and therefore significantly impact upon policy 
outcomes.  
 
The paper’s key findings are, first, the informal nature and historical embeddedness of 
decision making around issues and resource areas of central importance to climate change 
policy. Climate policy and finance are received into existing institutions, policy priorities, 
modalities of governance and patterns of political conflict that will shape them and with which 
they have to contend or compete. Second, our findings show how outcomes are a function of 
the interests, relations of power and policy networks that shape the prospects of realising 
climate change and development goals. Third, our analysis focuses attention on the role of 
the global drivers on national level climate change debates and the ways in which they open 
up and close down different pathways towards climate change and development goals; how 
common global drivers, once refracted through national levels institutions and policy 
processes, have very different impacts upon national level climate change debates. Fourth, 
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climate change and development outcomes, and the associated trade-offs, look very different 
depending on how they are defined, who defines them, and in what constellation of actors. 
This highlights the importance of understanding authority, knowledges and subjectivities as 
noted in the introduction to this special issue. The key policy implication of the paper is that 
this type of analysis can help decision makers to understand the conditions under which 
climate finance can achieve its goals, by shedding light on key factors that may help or hinder 
the achievement of climate policy goals.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two lays out the analytical framework, which is 
applied to the two case studies set out in section three. Section four brings out some of the 
common findings and insights across the case studies. Section five concludes with reflections 
on the wider significance of the findings and some directions for future research.  
 
 
2 Analytical framework 
 
The idea of integrating climate policy and development goals is not new: Arguably, at its core 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Convention (UNFCCC) is about balancing 
emission reductions with adaptation and development goals. The first comprehensive 
research on the linkages between development, adaptation and mitigation came through the 
‘Development First’ project (Davidson et al. 2003; Beg et al. 2001). The key argument 
advanced was that investments in development would suffer if they overlooked synergies and 
trade-offs, leading to increased vulnerability (Halsnaes and Verhagen, 2007). Although there 
was also scepticism about the potential synergies and co-benefits between adaptation and 
mitigation (Klein et al., 2005), the idea of synergies between climate change and development 
goals gained momentum throughout the 2000s, supported through the growing climate 
change focus among development agencies and NGOs and the increased traction offered by 
the use of concepts such as ‘low carbon development’, in place of climate mitigation, and 
‘climate resilient development’ as a catch-all term for adaptation and vulnerability concerns 
combined (Bahadur and Tanner, 2010; ADD REF).  
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Apart from the argument that integration of climate policy and development goals can achieve 
synergies, improve effectiveness and avoid trade-offs, we consider that their integration would 
be likely to increase the ethical acceptability and political feasibility of emissions reductions in 
contexts and countries where historical contributions to climate change have been negligible,  
and the rationale for emissions mitigation measures would therefore require added 
development or adaptation-focused benefits.    
 
Over recent years, the attention has increasingly shifted from the concepts and how they link 
to development policy and practice, to funding and implementation, through a range of 
programmes for development of national strategies, technical assistance, institutional 
strengthening, and capacity building for handling and implementing funded programmes 
(REF). 
 
With a few exceptions (REF), the missing link in these debates has been examinination of the 
politics of climate change and development policy, namely the processes through which 
climate change and development policies are conceived and implemented at national and 
subnational levels. Such initiatives do not evolve in a political vacuum. Rather, they unfold 
within and are shaped by existing policy and decision-making processes (Newell and Bumpus 
2012; Phillips and Newell 2013). Yet political economy analysis is missing from much 
engagement on climate change and development (Tanner and Allouche 2011), which often 
focuses on technical assistance, toolkits and capacity building. Understanding the prevailing 
political economy is central in broadening the understanding and commitment of decision 
makers, to address structural barriers to integrating climate concerns into development, 
improving coordination, collaboration and mobilisation amongst key stakeholders, and 
strengthening institutional capacity to deliver more integrated climate and development 
outcomes. In the broadest sense, the wider political economy determines the feasibility of 
efforts to bring these kinds of changes about. 
 
We situate our work within calls for greater attention to political economy in tackling climate 
change and development (Tanner and Allouche 2011). These calls are in turn rooted in 
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debates over how success (or failure) in addressing causes and impacts of climate change 
will have profound implications for continuing development and the extent to which  poverty 
can be reduced (UNDP 2007). We employ a broad definition of political economy as “the 
processes by which ideas, power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated and 
implemented by different groups at different scales” (Tanner & Allouche, 2011:2). This 
definition signals our intention to broaden the analysis beyond state-focused environmental 
politics, extending it to interactions between the state and non-state actors.  
 
Our starting point is that policy development and implementation processes are best 
described as “incremental, complex and messy”, involving actors with often competing goals 
and interests, which deploy knowledge and expertise in strategic ways (Keeley & Scoones, 
1999, Tanner & Allouche, 2011). Actors influence policy formulation in different ways. Pre-
existing institutional frameworks and the actions of opposition political parties, civil society, 
private sector interest groups, and the state itself can impose significant constraints on policy 
implementation such that the content and application of policies can diverge substantially from 
original intentions (Bonnal and Kato 2011). This view is in contrast to a traditional-rational-
positivist-linear view, in which the focus is typically on the quality of the technical knowledge 
that is available to policy-makers, who then make policy changes grounded in a thorough 
understanding of ‘the problem’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  
 
In order to understand the non-linear, deeply political character of policy processes, we draw 
on the work of Keeley and Scoones (1999, 2003) and Wolmer et al. (2006) on the politics of 
policy processes to deploy a framework that integrates three common strands in 
understanding the underlying dynamics that determine the outcomes of policy and practice 
(see figure 1).  
 
The first, politics (and interests), emphasises the interactions of state and civil society, and 
different interest groups, social segments or classes. This is the core of classic political 
economy analysis, but it has been criticised for limiting itself to material factors, in ways that 
overlook the role of ideas and ideologies in determining policy outcomes (Barnett and 
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Finnemore 2004). To address such criticisms, the second strand in the Keeley and Scoones 
framework, narratives and evidence, examines the histories and practices linked to shifting 
discourses, and how these shape and guide policy problems and courses of action. The third 
strand, on actors and institutions, gives primacy to the roles and agency (or capacity to make 
a difference) of individual actors. This is about practical approaches to influencing outcomes 
that are informed by political economy analysis and the scope for human/ social agency to 
overcome structural constraints and to change institutions. From this, we use this 
understanding to assist the development and implementation of more effective policies and 
institutional frameworks that can bring about more integrated climate and development 
pathways. We do this by emphasising ‘policy spaces’, defined by Gaventa (2006:26) as 
“opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, 
discourses and decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests”. This provides 
moments and venues where advocates for particular climate-related objectives can focus their 
efforts to exert influence over contested policy processes. It is necessary a) for these spaces 
to be identified, and b) to devise strategies for operating effectively within them. 
 
We apply this framework to the cases of low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in 
Mozambique. They were chosen because they illustrate key intersections between climate 
policy and development goals. We focus in particular on three aspects, which structure the 
case studies:  
1. Context: In each case study, we establish the policy challenge and characterise the 
recent historical and institutional context most pertinent to understanding and addressing 
it. This helps to map out the broad landscape of power within which interventions aiming 
at CCD have to operate. 
2. Competition and conflict: We then analyse the actors, institutions and power relations that 
shape the resolution of policy processes on particular terms, favouring some actors and 
outcomes over others.  
3. Consequences: Finally, we examine the outcomes that result or are likely to result from 
the patterns of competition, conflict and collaboration described above. This helps to 
identify who the winners and losers are, how the benefits and disadvantages of current 
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patterns of resource use are distributed and how trade-offs have been resolved and could 
be resolved otherwise.  
 
Data were collected on each of these components through desk review of academic and 
‘grey’ literature on the policy context and processes, in-country semi-structured interviews and 
group discussions with government officials and representatives from donors, business 
associations and academia at national and regional levels, as well as a learning event (see 
also Table 1). In Kenya, 29 stakeholder interviews were carried out in Nairobi, and a learning 
event was held in March, 2014.
1
 In Mozambique, the team carried out 24 stakeholder 
interviews, a focus group discussion in  Chimoio, Manica Province  and a broader stakeholder 
discussion at  a learning event in Maputo in February, 2014.
2
 The stakeholder learning events 
were particularly useful as they served the purpose both of validating preliminary research 
findings, as well as bringing researchers, interviewees and other key actors together, mapping 
the key networks for policy spaces for further engagement. A public event synthesising the 
findings across the case studies were held in London, July 2014, providing opportunities to 
reflect on findings and draw out commonalities and contrasts across the case studies.
3
  
 
3 Case studies: Low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in Mozambique 
 
3.1 Low carbon energy in Kenya 
 
Context – Renewable energy technologies promise low cost electricity  
 
The energy sector in Kenya presents an interesting test case for climate policy and 
development goals (Newell et al. 2014). Given the low level of access to electricity that the 
majority of Kenyans experience, increasing electricity generation is among the current 
government’s highest priorities and a core strategy for driving economic growth. New 
                                               
 
 
1
 Further detail in Newell et al (2014) 
2
 Further detail in Quan et al. (2014) 
3
 Refer to CDKN and all three case studies here 
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renewable energy technologies can potentially meet not only climate change mitigation aims, 
but also reduce the vulnerability of hydroelectricity supply to climate change induced water 
scarcity, and increase resilience to climate variability for the rural poor through the provision 
of energy services like irrigation and refrigeration, or the diversification of rural economies 
through other productive uses of energy. 
 
In Kenya national energy security goals (for cheap, reliable electricity generation from 
indigenous sources) are seen by both government and donors to be well served by some key 
renewable energy technologies, such as grid connected geothermal power and off-grid solar 
home systems. These renewable energy technologies have been judged to be cost-
competitive with fossil fuel generation of electricity (Ministry of Energy 2011). This apparent 
‘triple win’ for climate change mitigation, adaptation and development has to be put in the 
context of the many inherent trade-offs that are associated with different energy futures, 
renewable or otherwise. For example, there are high levels of interest in exploiting Kenya’s 
oil, gas and coal reserves.  This interest is expressed drawing upon discourses of energy 
security, international trade, and national development that are similar to those that have 
been invoked to accelerate the growth of renewable energy technologies. New legislation for 
climate change mainstreaming, energy policy, petroleum development, and devolution form 
the background against which these trade-offs will be resolved.  
 
Competition and conflict – Embedding market-led development through renewable energy 
 
There are competing representations of what constitutes ‘development’, ‘low carbon energy’ 
and ‘pro-poor’ energy policy in Kenya. The recent embrace of renewable energy technologies 
in Kenyan policy is shaped by these representations, and contributes to their generation. The 
ability of various state and non-state actors to mobilise finance and support behind their vision 
of development is a function of their power and is visible in the outcomes of energy sector 
development.  
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Policies to mainstream climate change reveal the importance of understanding and engaging 
‘turf-wars’ over authority and resources between and within different parts of government. The 
Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) is the main vehicle for integrating climate concerns in 
the Kenyan policy context (Government of Kenya 2013). With significant donor support, it was 
developed in 2012 under the leadership of the Ministry of Environment and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR) to reduce Kenya’s vulnerability to climate change and to improve the 
country’s ability to utilise climate finance, particularly for adaptation programmes. Government 
and donor representatives describe the year-long consultation process that led to the 
conclusion of the CCAP as efficient, ‘smooth’ and ‘rapid’, but wide ranging and able to reach 
consensus across the board.  
 
Yet the Climate Change Action Plan remained unsupported by national legislation, after 
President Kibaki rejected a Bill in 2013 that would have introduced an independent Climate 
Change Authority to ensure the compliance of different Ministries. In the absence of an 
Authority body, the Ministry of Environment has little scope to circumscribe the activities of 
more powerful ministries that may be less invested in the process of climate change 
mainstreaming. For example the Ministry of Energy was represented in CCAP deliberations 
by relatively junior staff from the Ministry’s historically under-funded and politically 
marginalised Renewable Energy division (Byrne 2009). Where these turf wars touch upon 
core state interests such as energy, entrenched incumbent regime interests compete to 
secure control over an issue that relates to and potentially threatens their ways of working. 
 
Yet winners and losers from energy policy are not only created through competition, but also 
through the construction of consensus. As a means of attracting additional climate finance 
and support for adaptation programmes, the replacement for the rejected Climate Change 
Authority Bill had significant political support in Kenya. A relatively robust consensus has 
emerged between government ministries and donors with respect to opportunities for ‘green 
growth’, since some renewable energy technologies can provide electricity generation at 
scale and at low cost (MoEP 2012). Large scale wind power and geothermal energy have 
gained traction in formal government policy processes, due in part to the extent to which they 
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serve the existing development priorities of government agencies, the climate change 
concerns of donors, and the commercial interests of the international companies that are 
positioned to develop the resources. Both technologies have received large inflows of public 
investment in transmission lines (for wind energy), or in remote locations and drilling (for 
geothermal energy), which has reduced the risk profile of the projects for private investors.  
 
This support is in contrast to grid-connected solar power, for example, which has been 
actively discouraged by government, despite formally adopting a policy for its promotion 
(Ministry of Energy 2012). The government’s electricity procurement policy has been 
implemented such that the price to be paid to private sector solar power producers (the feed-
in tariff) is widely considered to be insufficient to mitigate the commercial risks of project 
development. The agency of a former Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Energy has 
been critical in determining this ‘red line’ for the government, and the subsequent short-term 
variability in the price has left investors with little confidence that profitability will be 
established and maintained, such that no solar power projects currently exist in Kenya. One 
member of the Kenyan energy regulator recalls that: ‘As an advocate for renewable energy, I 
can say that the decision to price solar low was a deliberate one’. Grid connected solar power 
has been judged to lock the state and consumers into long-term contracts for high cost 
energy. While formally adopting a policy to encourage investment in renewable energy, the 
informal process of creating private sector incentives has been used to discourage 
investments in solar.  
 
In contrast, solar power has found significant commercial success in off-grid applications, in 
line with government interests. Solar lamps or larger household scale systems can supply 
basic lighting and communicative functions such as mobile phone charging, and are often 
accompanied by discourses of political freedom – from kerosene fumes, from blackouts, or 
from the long wait for grid extension. They also free the state of the burden of infrastructure 
investments, individualising energy supply and shifting the relationship between citizen and 
state with respect to the provision of basic services. Yet despite powerful narratives that 
describe the diffusion of solar home systems as a free market success story (IFC 1998; 
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Hankins 2000), detailed tracking of the innovation history of these systems suggests that 
public money provided by donors was vital in building markets and networks, and in taking 
commercial risk that the private sector has been unwilling or unable to take (Ockwell et al 
2014). Recent initiatives such as the US Presidential Power Africa programme recognise the 
role of the state in energy provision, but do so in ways that formulate the state only as the 
facilitator of international investment in both large-scale grid connected electricity or ‘bottom of 
the pyramid’ off-grid, poor consumers (USAID 2014). There remains a key role for the 
entrepreneurial state in ensuring sustainable and affordable energy access through long term, 
proactive and forward looking policy; a state which sets the direction of change, supports 
R&D, and redresses inequities through tax, regulation and industrial policy (Mazzucato 2015).  
 
The market-making role of donors in promoting ‘pro-poor’ low carbon development is 
nonetheless ambiguous. Political economy analysis highlights the constraints on the capacity 
of developing countries to exercise policy autonomy over their development pathways 
(Gallagher 2005). In addition to the resources that they provide, donors have been involved in 
the production of knowledge and ideas have also been instrumental in shaping energy access 
in the Kenyan energy sector in important ways. Following droughts in the 1990s that 
highlighted the country’s reliance on hydropower, World Bank institutional reform packages 
were critical in instigating the commercialisation of Kenya’s public electricity companies and 
re-orienting the state toward the attraction of international capital (Tellam 2000; World Bank 
2005). Donors like working with Kenya because it is market orientated, and in this regard the 
country is often juxtaposed favourably with Tanzania. One donor manager commented that 
‘Kenya has always been private sector focused and avoided the virulent forms of socialism of 
some of its neighbours’. Yet the private sector ethos that now makes Kenya an attractive 
investment environment for geothermal energy companies is the same model that disfavours 
public investments in extending electricity access to unprofitable consumers that were 
arguably critical in the development of universal energy access in the global North. Through 
both the on-grid and off-grid electricity markets, a process of embedding markets in the 
Kenyan energy sector has unified the work of donors.  
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Hence, while businesses that stand to benefit from a growth in clean energy would need a 
greater voice energy debates in order to ensure that new energy generation is low carbon, 
assessing the consequences of market-led development for the poor is complex and not 
directly associated with the type of technology utilised, or its price tag. Moreover, while 
renewable energy associations are active in Kenyan energy policy debates, in practice 
different groups have differential access to and influence on government policy that is 
determined by their confluence with state interests. Those that represent small scale solar 
power technologies have reported the Ministry of Energy is less receptive to their policy 
suggestions than business groups that can claim to serve state priorities for macro-level 
energy security, such as the Kenyan Association of Manufacturers or the Kenya Private 
Sector Alliance. These commercial users of electricity lobby for prices to remain low in order 
to remain competitive, while some of the same large landowners look to become electricity 
suppliers to the grid, seeking high tariffs to incentivise their investments. These interests may 
not necessarily serve the interests of the energy poor or those unable to afford the full cost of 
electricity provision, however it is generated.  
 
Finally, the protracted and contested devolution process underway in Kenya has significant 
implications for the control of energy infrastructure and policy. Counties have made claims for 
control of grid extension for example, since reliable electricity supply is so critical to attract 
investors. It is also at the local scale where the politics of land are typically most acutely 
contested when land acquires additional value due to its energy resources. For example there 
has been a long term land conflict and a court dispute involving the Maasai people over the 
Olkaria geothermal project, which involves an exclusion zone around wellheads and 
restrictions on movement.  
 
Consequences – renewable energy, without the ‘triple win’ 
 
Large energy infrastructure projects in post-colonial Africa have always involved forms of 
partnership and dependence between the state and international capital. Yet renewable 
energy technologies have come to prominence during a period of energy sector liberalisation 
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that raises distinct challenges, and consequences. Technologies such as geothermal and 
wind power provide opportunities for climate change mitigation by exploiting the interests that 
have converged on the role that clean energies can play in addressing Kenya’s electricity 
supply shortfall and hydropower vulnerability. Yet the potential to ‘work with the grain’ of 
existing power relations, to exploit them for the benefit of climate change and development 
goals, is also limited in important ways. There are very real trade-offs to be made between 
serving a broader public interest and creating attractive investment environments; between 
the interests of industrial energy consumers, poor electricity consumers, and those that have 
been remained off-grid for decades under various management regimes; and between the 
goals of climate change mitigation and the envisioned role of fossil fuels such as coal and oil 
in the Kenyan economy. These relations of power have a critical effect on who secures 
access and who is expected to offer sacrifices in the name of national economic 
development.  
 
Moreover, these landscapes of power are consistently evolving. New power struggles are 
unfolding over the spoils of devolution and the authority that central and county level 
governments will exercise over key areas of policy such as energy. But it looks like being a 
possible site for change where counties have been enthusiastic about supporting renewable 
energy. If they are able to generate real benefits in terms of jobs and revenue, decentralised 
institutions could provide tangible wins for poorer groups. This is then both a worrying and 
exciting time for Kenya. Frequently affected by drought and highly vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change, Kenya has a lot to lose from climate change. But proactive responses to the 
issue that can help to improve energy access and do so in a low carbon way suggest the 
genuine potential of climate and developmental policy. Achieving equity in climate and energy 
policies is likely to necessitate not only an increase in social power for some actors, but a 
reduction in social power of some key incumbent actors and ideas.  
 
3.2 Carbon forestry and REDD+ in Mozambique  
Context – emergence of carbon forestry and REDD+ 
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Carbon forestry and the discussion around ongoing efforts to set up REDD+
4
 in Mozambique 
offers a pertinent example of the barriers and opportunities that climate policy and 
development goals will have to negotiate in practice (Quan et al., 2014). Initially set up as a 
mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, REDD+ has 
evolved and expanded to put increasing weight on ‘non-carbon benefits’; social, 
environmental and governance benefits (REFS). With the discussion around safeguards, 
REDD+ has increasingly moved into the development arena, with growing attention also 
being given to potential opportunities for synergies between mitigation and adaptation goals 
through policy coherence, enhanced ecosystem services, and attracting funding for multiple 
goals (Elias et al., 2014)
5
.  
 
On paper, Mozambique is an attractive country for REDD+ investments: Forest covers more 
than 50% of the country’s land area (Parker et al., 2009), and deforestation rates are high, 
driven by population growth, poverty and an absence of sustainable alternative livelihoods, in 
an institutional context characterised by lack of harmonisation amongst sector policies, weak 
implementation of policies and legislation, lack of capacity for land use planning and a lack of 
incentives to maintain forest cover.  
 
Since 2007, proposals to dedicate large areas to forestry and forest conservation land uses 
supported by REDD+ finance for purposes of carbon storage have emerged, against a 
background of rapid growth in large scale land investments in Mozambique, leading to 
growing incidence of tenure insecurity and land conflict (FIAN 2012, Norfolk and Hanlon 2012, 
Cotula 2011, Oakland Institute 2011, Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010). Conflicts associated 
with large scale forest investments in central and northern Mozambique have attracted 
considerable publicity and interest amongst researchers and development agencies. 
 
                                               
 
 
4
 Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to foster conservation, 
sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
5
 Cf. also Leonard, 2015: http://blog.cifor.org/29000/the-redd-framework-finally-complete-after-almost-10-
years#.VYQIvflViko  
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Yet REDD+ and carbon forestry have emerged in a contentious political context in 
Mozambique, with controversies over forest and land governance (Sitoe et al., 2012). A key 
issue is forest exploitation and management, including illegal logging, unprocessed timber 
exports, and the role of external, notably Chinese, interests in deforestation (Mackenzie 2006; 
Mackenzie and Ribeiro, 2009; Nhantumbo and Izidine, 2009). Linked to this are discussions 
over benefit sharing with local communities, large scale land investments and their impacts on 
small farmers. Although Mozambique’s land law recognises the land rights of rural 
communities established through customary and beneficial occupation, and enables them to 
register these rights through a relatively simple process of land delimitation (Borras et al. 
2012, Norfolk and Tanner 2006, Tanner and Baleira 2006, Toulmin and Quan 2000), 
community land registration has not been systematically implemented by the government. In 
contrast, private investors have found it relatively easy to gain leasehold titles for land 
development and natural resource exploitation, for which the law provides only weak 
safeguards and procedures for consultation for affected communities (Hoekma 2012). 
 
REDD+ is nominally part of the national climate change strategy (RoM, 2012). However, there 
is little connection between REDD+ and the broader climate change debates. REDD+ 
planning has been narrowly focused, with little reference to ongoing forest management 
problems, and the role of forest resources in climate change adaptation. Interviewees 
described the REDD+ actors as very separate from the debates over adaptation, and REDD+ 
as a “non-issue” in the debate
6
. The debate has been confined to specific groupings of actors. 
The Ministry for Environmental Coordination (MICOA) has, as the lead agency on climate 
change, tended to concentrate on the potential contributions that REDD+ can make to 
emissions reduction and to revenue generation at national scale, whereas the National 
Directorate for Lands and Forests (DNTF, part of the Ministry of Agriculture) plays a joint 
leadership role for REDD+ and focuses on the need to improve an under-resourced forest 
management regime, which suffers from a lack of resources. The forest sector as a whole is 
subject to perverse incentives for official rent-seeking in licensing forest operations at multiple 
                                               
 
 
6
 WB Jan 2014 
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levels, enabling illegal logging and unprocessed timber exports. There is an apparent lack of 
high level political will and vested interests which allow uncontrolled forest degradation to 
continue. These are questions that REDD+ planning and finance have so far been unable to 
address.    
 
 
At the time of fieldwork, there had been no progress in practical implementation of REDD+ 
financed projects, and there was only one operational carbon forestry initiative, the Sofala 
Carbon Project, operated by the company Envirotrade (Jindal et al., 2012). In response to a 
wave of proposals for large scale forest land concessions for REDD+ from potential investors 
and international agencies, Mozambique developed framework legislation to manage the 
licensing of REDD+ projects and associated government taxes and revenues, with assistance 
from the World Bank and others. Knowledge of REDD+ finance opportunities was confined to 
central government, a handful of international agencies (World Bank, UN-REDD and some 
bilateral donors) and investment proponents with an inside track.  
 
In combination, these proposals targeted over 30% of Mozambique’s total land area (Hanlon 
2012, MICOA, 2013). Policy debate was restricted to central government and the global 
agencies, with scant attention to feasibility, impacts, or linkages to climate adaptation on the 
ground. None of the proposed projects have since been approved, and the tax regime, 
licensing and land allocation conditions imposed now appear to create significant 
disincentives for proponents. In parallel however, the policy network has broadened through a 
local-international alliance of research institutions, NGOs and a national social enterprise 
organisation that attracted Norwegian funding to scope and pilot REDD+ initiatives (‘Testing 
REDD+’
7
), working alongside government, local communities and a forest land stakeholders 
and users in central Mozambique.  The country recently published a national REDD+ decree,
8
 
which was welcomed by many actors eager to start implementing, but also raised several 
                                               
 
 
7
 http://www.iied.org/testing-redd-mozambique 
8
 Law 70/2013; Boletim da Republica, Government of Mozambique, 20 December 2013 
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areas of concern, notably that it would encourage in particular large scale projects, and on 
benefit sharing. 
 
Competition and conflict – competing narratives 
While REDD+ is deemed attractive by many, it is also facing considerable challenges in 
reconciling land, forest governance and development goals. One of the key difficulties have 
been the lack of clear institutional responsibilities for leadership, and a consequent 
uncertainty about what REDD+ projects would mean in practice. Two key government actors 
have been involved: MICOA, the Ministry for Environmental Coordination, with the mandate 
for cross-sector coordination in the fields of environment and climate change; and DNTF, the 
National Directorate for Lands and Forests, part of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), 
responsible for forest management and likely to be centrally involved in supervising 
implementation of REDD+ projects and the monitoring of forest cover and forest carbon 
stocks. 
 
MICOA and DNTF has had very different views on REDD+. MICOA considers REDD+ as 
primarily an opportunity for Mozambique to contribute to climate change mitigation through 
emissions reduction and forest carbon sequestration, and in turn revenue generation from 
carbon payments; a process which should lead to considerable revenue generation as a 
result of carbon payments through the voluntary carbon markets or from disbursement of 
global forest carbon funds. DNTF however still remains the lead technical agency, and both 
organisations are involved in the REDD+ Technical Unit, which is housed within MICOA, a 
situation which various informants described as the result of a considerable power struggle 
between MICOA and DNTF. MICOA’s lack of technical expertise in forest management and 
carbon monitoring will require strong collaboration with the DNTF and with MINAG more 
broadly in order to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in 
Mozambique. In practice both agencies will have a role in scrutinising and approving REDD+ 
projects as defined in the legislation, although it is unclear how they will work together. 
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Beyond this, there are numerous tensions in the process originating from concerns over 
REDD+ in Mozambique chiefly focusing on large scale carbon forestry and forest 
conservation, complaints over very limited opportunities for participation among key 
stakeholders, and a view among some that REDD+ to a large extent is a ‘done deal’ with few 
opportunities for modification.  
 
From this, three competing narratives on carbon forestry and REDD+ can be identified in 
Mozambique (Quan et al., 2014): one that frames it as a source of revenue and growth; 
another that is critically opposed, on grounds of commercialisation of nature for private gain 
and risks of exclusion of the rural poor; and a third that accepts potential REDD+ contributions 
to climate mitigation and scope to deliver real development benefits conditionally, depending 
on the approaches adopted. Whereas government and the private sector have generally 
aligned with the first point of view, and a group of vocal nationally active NGOs linked to 
global Via Campesina and Friends of the Earth International networks adopt the second, a 
mixed and potentially expanding grouping of civil society, academic and some private sector 
actors and international agencies, including the Norwegian supported alliance adopts the 
third, middle ground perspective. Others have remained agnostic and not engaged in REDD+ 
debates, which only notionally addressed the climate change vulnerability and adaptation 
questions that many actors prioritise. 
 
These narratives are broadly aligned with those in international debates on REDD+, and are 
arguably influenced by ideological pro- and anti- market perspectives in relation to natural 
resources and environmental services, rather than evidence of REDD+ performance and 
sustainability of forest utilization on the ground in Mozambique. They are coloured, however, 
by Mozambique’s recent history of large scale land acquisition, ensuing conflicts and policy 
controversies, and negative features of REDD+ and forest investment experience elsewhere. 
Interviewees highlighted the controversy around a relative lack of transparency and limited 
consultation in the REDD+ process in Mozambique, and a general lack of practical models to 
understand of how carbon payments for REDD+ will actually work, if not through the sale of 
carbon credits. 
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The fortunes of Mozambique’s limited carbon forestry experience through the Sofala Carbon 
Project have also created scepticism among many civil society actors. This project did not 
seek to acquire direct control of forest or community land, but aimed to increase farmer and 
community incomes by combining tree planting and improved natural forest management to 
produce carbon credits for sale on the voluntary market, and company – community revenue 
sharing.  Despite an EU grant, however it faced difficulties attracting investors, sustaining 
farmer incentives and financing sustainable community livelihoods and natural resource 
management activities due to the declining price of carbon (Mathur et al. 2014; Jindal et al. 
2012). 
 
Consequences 
A range of possible REDD+ approaches and outcomes can link climate policy and 
development goals, but with potentially very different outcomes for communities reliant on 
forest resources and farming in terms of the balance and distribution of benefits. Outcomes 
largely depend on the nature of REDD+ activities in practice, and the ways in which these can 
combine, on the one hand, conservation and improved management of natural forest and, on 
the other, exclusion or inclusion of local communities, small scale farmers and other forest 
users from forest carbon areas and projects. Mozambique’s limited carbon forestry suggests 
both risks of benefit capture by relatively well-off farmers, and a potential to derive much 
greater carbon savings from natural forest conservation and management rather than tree 
planting, and greater potential for community benefit sharing, sustainable forest industries and 
improved agricultural practices. Difficulties remain, however in measuring and verifying 
carbon storage in natural and semi-natural forests, and carbon payments through the 
Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) have not been sufficient to finance these sorts of activities, 
leaving projects dependent on supplementary sources of finance. 
  
Although there is some limited policy space to achieve a balance amongst small and large 
scale REDD+ approaches, the place of natural and planted forest in low carbon development, 
as well as the interests of different stakeholder groups, there is no single body in Mozambique 
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with REDD+ oversight, mandate, technical capacity, institutional interest, adequate networks 
and convening power to engage the full range of actors and establish a feasible and 
sustainable mix of REDD+ activities. There remain huge uncertainties in what REDD+ will 
look like in practice, whether and how REDD+ activities may contribute to a climate change 
and development policy goals in Mozambique, and the social distribution of costs and 
benefits.  
 
Moreover, a dimension that climate change and REDD+ debates in Mozambique have not 
addressed so far is the linkage of Mozambique’s rapid economic growth trajectory with fossil 
fuel extraction, export and utilisation. The recent discoveries of large commercial coal and 
natural gas deposits in the Zambezi and Rovuma basins has increased the role of fossil fuels 
in Mozambique’s energy and development mix. Although this may ultimately reduce reliance 
on charcoal and resulting forest degradation, growing industrialisation and fossil fuel 
consumption, including construction of coal-fired power stations will increase carbon 
emissions and demand for mitigation, while mining development and the associated growth in 
infrastructure, industrial activity and the economy as a whole will themselves increase 
emissions from land use change, while agriculture and logging place continuing pressure on 
forest resources.   
 
In its dominant conception in Mozambique, REDD+ has been posited as a techno-managerial 
solution for carbon emissions reduction that presents opportunities for private profit and 
government revenue generation. This approach has ignored the complex, contested political 
context of forest and land use dynamics in the country, and treated exclusion of forest 
dependent communities as a technical problem, somehow solvable at the project level, or by 
policy action in other sectors. Significantly, the importance of Mozambique's forest resources 
to climate change adaptation at national, landscape and local scales is absent.  Narrow 
sector-based perspectives, failures of institutional coordination, centralizing political 
tendencies, vested elite and external interests in business-as-usual timber extraction, and 
limitations in policy space for actor participation all illustrate the centrality of political economy 
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in reframing REDD+ in Mozambique to address broader national interests in accessing and 
utilizing climate finance. 
 
REDD+ has potentially considerable implications for adaptation, yet so far its discussion – 
and contestation - has taken place within sectoral confines, disconnected from adaptation or 
broader development goals. Private sector and government interests have combined to shape 
a fairly narrow set of options for utilisation of REDD+ finance around environmental benefits 
and forest management. Arguably, however, the lack of momentum on REDD+ finance in 
Mozambique may also provide options for giving more emphasis to the non-carbon values of 
forests, including adaptation.  
 
4 Discussion: What do the case studies tell us about the intersections between 
climate and development policy goals and national policy contexts?  
 
Four issues stand out from the preceding sections, broadly mapping onto the framework 
outlined at the start.  
 
4.1 Historical contexts and contested political ecologies 
 
The historical context matters. While the climate policy context is new, both low carbon 
energy and carbon forestry have entered arenas of long standing entrenched interests and 
power relations.  Each of debates about competing use of resources discussed here have 
long historical trajectories, and illustrate the need to understand issues of resource access, 
property and justice in each setting in a way which also brings political ecology into  political 
economy (Robbins). In other words, identifying the broader contextual factors within which 
climate policy and development initiatives sit is critical if we want to have a clearer idea of 
how feasible they are and what needs to change in order for their achievement to become a 
more realistic prospect. The Mozambique study showed, for example, the importance of 
understanding long standing controversies surrounding land tenure, large scale land 
investment, forest management, and agricultural intensification, beyond the confines of the 
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national climate change debates. Similarly in Kenya, devolution has created new sites of 
contest over control of electricity grid extension while geothermal resource development adds 
new value to land that has been under contested ownership for decades, fuelling renewed, 
violent evictions. Capturing these dynamics means going beyond institutional mapping and 
the formal flows of decision-making authority to try and understand the informal networks and 
practices that shape who participates in key decisions and who wields most influence in 
different policy spaces. This is the value of deeper political economy analysis – in opening up 
understanding of the political, social and institutional landscape into which climate finance and 
development initiatives enter and which, if they are to be effective, they will have to engage. 
 
4.2 Power, politics and institutions 
 
Money talks, also in climate change and development. There is great deal at stake in debates 
over climate change and development goals. This brings different institutions with competing 
mandates and a wide variety of actors with conflicting material interests and uneven power 
into competition with one another across the different policy spaces in which CCD is 
addressed. Getting a clear handle on the levels of finance (‘following the money’), for 
example, is crucial to understanding the alignments of interests assembled for – and against 
– CCD.  All three countries have significant fossil fuel reserves that represent the ‘elephant in 
the room’ in discussions over climate change and development and both Kenya and 
Mozambique’s energy trajectories could just as easily follow a high carbon as a low carbon 
trajectory. Power will determine which pathway is chosen. Incentive structures remain in place 
for state elites to continue to accommodate donor priorities, creating additional or parallel 
policy initiatives while pursuing more lucrative revenues afforded by carbon-
intensive development. Such is the case with donor-led efforts in Kenya to support lower 
carbon forms of energy for large populations off-grid, while policy makers focus their attention 
on the exploration and production of coal, oil and gas, for both domestic and international 
consumption. Global subsidies for fossil fuel production and consumption dwarf both the 
support for renewable energy technologies, and the investments required for universal access 
to modern energy services (IMF 2015). In Mozambique, the discovery of coal and gas 
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reserves could be a considerable driver of deforestation and land use change, yet has so far 
not figured in debates over REDD+ and carbon forestry in the country. Indeed, the risk is that 
interest in capturing rents from these resources could drown out voices calling for initiatives 
like REDD+ that might, in some ways at least, be much more conducive to development.  
 
4.3 International political economy 
 
While there is an increasing focus on nationally driven processes, both low carbon energy 
and carbon forestry still appear as internationally driven, with (as yet) limited national 
ownership. In both cases, the analysis helped bring out the extent to which drivers of change 
are coming from outside government, suggesting the value of tools and approaches from 
international political economy. These can be used to explain how donors and international 
businesses can shape the degree of policy autonomy or ‘developmental space’ (Gallagher 
2005) available to developing countries to handle trade-offs between poverty alleviation, 
mitigation and adaptation in ways which advance their own preferred development pathways. 
Across the three case studies international agencies, multilateral development banks and 
transnational corporations have a powerful role to play in shaping decisions at national and 
sub-national level about which development pathway to pursue and the extent to which it will 
be compatible with both climate policy and development goals. This is because of their control 
of finance, production, technology and trade. Whether it is flows of finance from REDD+ and 
the fluctuating price of carbon credits affecting the balance of political power in Mozambique 
or the presence of donors and investors in Kenya rallying behind particular low carbon energy 
options, global actors have a key role to play in how CCD trade-offs are weighted and 
managed.  
 
This is also confirmed by other recent case studies, highlighting how external pressures can 
exacerbate competition and conflict, for example, around donors’ bilateral links with individual 
agencies. In Ghana, the removal of fuel subsidies has little association with climate change 
mitigation for national elites who face renewed budgetary constraints (Tanner et al., 2014), 
whereas climate change mitigation priorities strengthen the hand of multilateral donors for 
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whom such public subsidies are already an inefficient use of government resources. In 
Kenya, climate change and the vulnerability of hydropower to low rainfall has driven the 
diversification of the electricity mix. But any energy source that can generate electricity at low 
cost and at large scale is being considered – renewable or non-renewable, including 
additional hydropower power (MoEP 2012). While the demonstrable impacts of climate 
change are steering policy, climate change mitigation remains a donor driven priority.  
 
4.4 Levers for change 
 
The case studies also illustrate some of the levers for change, the power to be navigated, and 
with whom external or internal actors will have to engage in order to address the climate 
change and development goals. The Kenya study showed, for example, how the country is at 
a critical juncture for its renewable energy policy, and political economy analysis can help 
identify coalitions to push against those who have vested interests that go against climate 
change and development goals. 
 
The Mozambique study illustrated how REDD+ may take very different forms depending on 
who is defining it. Overall, there are many potential scenarios that conceivably could be seen 
as in line with climate change and development, but they represent very different visions of 
what development is, what type of practical interventions should take place, how benefit 
sharing should be organised, and could generate very distinct discursive framings of what 
should count as climate change and development goals.  
 
For instance, while REDD+ is compatible with large scale forest conservation, which could 
potentially offer mitigation benefits, they are less likely to be pro-poor and tend to restrict 
access of poor people to agricultural land and natural resources. Conversely, REDD+ could 
mean smaller scale carbon agroforestry projects that could provide development, adaptation 
and mitigation benefits, but which are struggling to secure sufficient finance in view of the 
challenges in achieving carbon savings at scale and the poor performance of the carbon 
markets. If these efforts have less traction with a government more focused on larger 
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investments in land with greater scale effects, then resources may be mobilised away from 
one vision of climate change and development goals more rooted in poverty reduction and 
towards one which favours existing interest groups already well-placed to press their 
advantage. The risk, in other words, is that framings that serve large scale REDD+ projects 
simply reinforce a political economy of elite rent capture from big ‘development’ projects 
sanctioned by broader government narratives that prioritise rapid economic growth, but do not 
necessarily deliver poverty reduction. The Kenya case study also raises questions about the 
social impacts of the embrace of ‘lower carbon’ geothermal energy, and highlights the ways 
that geothermal energy has become more attractive to the existing supply system than those 
that would require more substantive change in the way that electricity and social power is 
distributed. 
 
5 Conclusions: Understanding and navigating complex change processes 
 
This paper asked the question of what happens when initiatives motivated by climate change 
policy goals hit wider and more complex national development policy contexts, illustrated by 
the cases of low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in Mozambique. In both 
countries, understanding the prospects for achieving climate change and development goals 
– low carbon energy and carbon forestry, respectively – require an unpacking of the political 
economy surrounding the issues; the politics, power and interests that shape the debates, 
drive the agenda and determine outcomes. Notwithstanding the significant differences 
between the two case studies, they also provide lessons on the potentials - and limitations - of 
how to navigate complex change processes. Three lessons stand out are, first, that debates 
must be understood in view of long standing debates and struggles over resources between 
institutions and actors which affect how and why they engage with climate change policy. 
Second, attempts to work with or against the grain of politics in a particular setting require an 
appreciation of the social and political networks and relations of power which will determine 
how the trade-offs inherent to climate change and development goals are worked through and 
on whose behalf. Third, the role of the global political economy, in the form of global 
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economic institutions, corporations and donors, critically shapes outcomes at the national 
level. 
 
The analysis showed how initiatives to support climate change and development policy goals 
unfold within and are shaped by existing policy and decision making processes, which need 
to be understood and engaged with. Political economy analysis can provide a way of reading 
the political and institutional landscape. For donors and others to work out who they can 
support and who is resistant to an agenda focussed on climate change and development. But 
is can also be of use to groups trying to mobilise around climate resilient development and 
aiming to expose some of the obstacles to change that could be beneficial to poorer groups. 
Either way political economy analysis cannot be reduced to a generic tool to manage change 
on terms set by powerful external actors nor as a shorthand for highlighting governance 
failures in already weak and struggling states. It should rather serve as a useful starting point 
for an informed and grounded discussion about who is benefiting from existing ways of 
addressing climate change and development, how and why; and more importantly who is not 
and what can be done about it. 
 
Political economy analysis is well suited to identifying how and why climate and development 
trajectories are either enabled or frustrated by existing policy processes. As such, it is 
increasingly utilised by donors as a tool to characterise informal relations that can frustrate 
formal processes, and in order to create openings to construct more effective coalitions for 
change. Yet political economy analysis is perhaps most powerful where it can also provide 
insights into the injustices and exclusions that result from business-as-usual policy-making 
that is unlikely to be reversed by institutional tinkering and near-term policy reform. These 
changes require longer-term efforts to shift the balance of power in favour of poorer and 
excluded groups that have most to lose from climate change and, potentially at least, the 
most to gain from actions which simultaneously reduce poverty, lower greenhouse gas 
emissions, and strengthen resilience. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual lenses for analysing policy processes (adapted from Wolmer et al 2006) 
 
 
Table 1:  components of analysis, research questions & methods 
Stage of 
analysis 
Questions Methods Who to engage and how 
Context What is the policy 
problem/resource issue? 
 
Who/what are the key 
actors/institutions/processes? 
Actor and institution 
mapping 
 
 
Document analysis 
 
Identify key policy 
documents/processes/ 
decision-making 
arenas 
Involve actors in their 
own ‘perception’ 
mapping of networks of 
power & influence 
 
Use this analysis to 
identify key change 
agents for research  
engagement & uptake 
 
 
Competition How are they linked? (spaces, 
brokers & intermediaries) 
 
What is their influence and 
Mapping Networks 
 
Following processes 
 
Interviews 
 
Participatory actor 
mapping 
Narratives and 
evidence 
Politics and 
interests 
Actors and 
institutions 
Adaptation 
policy 
characteristic
s 
 Stability 
 Robustness  
 Adaptability 
 Targeting  
Policy space 
-expanding policy 
capacities 
-broadening policy 
horizons 
-affecting policy regimes Analytical 
lenses 
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power? (How much/what type? 
Material, institutional, 
discursive/structural/visible-
invisible etc) 
Tracing informal 
networks of power & 
formal/institutional 
expressions of power 
 
Identify key policy 
moments (case studies) 
from above  
 
network analysis 
 
Consequences 
 
What are the implications for 
CCD? (trade-offs, who wins/loses, 
scenarios for change) 
 
Scenarios- expanding 
policy spaces for 
‘triple-win’ 
 
Trade-off analysis at 
workshops with potential 
change agents 
 
Try and link to key policy 
debates/windows for 
change 
